Cicely Saunders made it clear that her original 'vision' included the care of older people: 'terminal care should not be a facet of oncology, but of geriatric medicine, neurology, general practice and throughout medicine'. 1 Moreover, the evidence of palliative care need among older people confirms that there should be tight links between the specialities. Cancer has a higher incidence among older people, particularly those aged over 85, and the incidence of respiratory, circulatory and nervous disease is weighted heavily towards people in older age groups. 2 These latter conditions give rise to symptoms and complex psychosocial needs comparable to those experienced by the most severely ill cancer patients and their families. 3 Old age care and palliative care indeed have a history of similar concerns. Both emphasize quality of life as the key determinant of choices in care and treatment options, both make the person and family the unit of care, and both have placed a strong emphasis on multidisciplinary models of care. 4 There are other interesting parallels between the two specialties: both developed outside of mainstream health care and in response to the pressing needs of hitherto neglected patient groups (older people and dying people). Each then sought to reincorporate its skills and knowledge base back within mainstream systems. Both then defined a territory of specialist care focusing, respectively, on advanced pain and symptom management (palliative care) and the care of patients with multiple pathologies (old age medicine).
With this has come a more biomedical focus and, for geriatric medicine, a central role in acute hospital care of older (and younger) patients. But there is also evidence that the holistic approach of the two specialities is now taking root more generally. 'Supportive care' 'rehabilitation', 'dignity', 'respect' and 'autonomy' have become accepted principles underpinning policy development and core standards of good practice relating to the care of patients in all settings.
In spite of these gains, older people are still systematically disadvantaged in terms of their access to specialist services, including palliative care. The roots of this disadvantage can be related to ageist stereotypes that predominated in the twentieth century and which are only now coming under sustained critique. These saw old age characterized as a 'problem', from which burden the wider community had to be protected. The impact of this alarmist discourse on the shaping of health care policy and practice with older people has been profound. 5 We know that, for example, older people tend not to be referred to specialist palliative care in-patient units proportional to their needs for such care, nor to receive care at home that would enable them to die at home. 6, 7 This is most problematic among older people with non cancer palliative care needs, but is even the case among older cancer patients, a group who at all ages have preferential access to specialist palliative care. 6 As well as discrimination based on age and diagnosis, there is clear evidence that setting of care is a determinant of the type and standard of care that older people receive. We know that people aged 85 and over are most likely to die in residential and nursing home care, where worries about care standards and lack of referral for specialist assessment and services (including geriatric medicine and palliative care) have long been expressed. The accusation that specialist care is 'five star care for the few' 8 is, we would argue, a very real spectre looming over the whole mission of providing high quality palliative care for all older people. At the moment inadequately developed assessment and referral policies mean that access is determined by habitual practices, not by need. As a result, many older people's experiences of old age and dying are characterized by unacceptable levels of suffering.
It seems that to eradicate these unacceptable traits of old age care, some hard choices need to be made. Questions about the macro-allocation of resources and distributive justice come to the fore here. In discussing the ethics of resource allocation in palliative care, Randall and Downie 9 pose the questions related to a 'minimum level of care': '… first: what constitutes that decent minimum level of care, and secondly is there a moral obligation to provide more than the minimum level?'
The recent publication of standards of care in cancer and palliative care and the forthcoming National Service Framework for Older People are valuable examples of how such a decent minimum level might be determined. 10 It is clear however, that the provision to some of care of less than that minimum standard is morally indefensible when others, because of their age, diagnosis, setting of care, or because of habits relating to referral or assessment procedures, are receiving care far above the minimum standard.
Palliative care and geriatric medicine have developed three key roles in the care of older people facing dying and death: managing those with the most complex needs; setting standards of good practice; and disseminating good practice through training, education and research. Yet both specialties face challenges in fulfilling these roles. The development of referral criteria, modes of rapid assessment, joint working practices and 'outreach' to all care settings and diagnostic groups are essential components which are not yet fully developed. Closer partnerships between the two specialties will be essential if rapid identification and transfer of patients in need are to be achieved. Most notably, the commitment to change and the focus on those dying in disadvantaged circumstances demonstrated so charismatically by the early founders of palliative and geriatric care must be rekindled and set alight in new ways.
